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1To afanatical savage, a bomb
dropped out of the sky on the
sacred temple ofhis omnipotent God
Is a sign and a symbol that that
God has withdrawn hisfcaxnsr.!
It's War, JIm, But Not As We l(now It:
A 'Reality-Check' for International Laws of War?
Elizabeth Chadwick
1. Introduction,
Assuming, for purposes of argument. that war is employed to pursue an economic
,
agenda, as is often the case, the rationale for the use of force can be something as
straightforward as access to or control of territory. At this point, the twin motives
of war and economics are joined by their helpmeets 'liberation-rhetoric' and
'terrorism'. Justificatory liberation-rhetoric is rarely very far away in economics-
grounded warfare. and it is little surprtse that the most common type of armed
conflict since 1945 has been that for national liberation in one form or another.
The impulse for these and other 'mixed' (internal-external) wars in the post-1945
era has been the struggle of peoples for self-determtnatton,a the prtnciple of which
is found wtthin an V.N. Charter system which (a) prohibits inter-state armed
1 E. Colby, 'How to Fight Savage Trtbes' (1927]21 A.J.I.L.279, 287.
2 U.N. Charter, Articles 1(21, and 55. See, e.g.. R Norton-Taylor and O. Bowcott,
'Deadly cost of the new warfare', The Guardian. 22 October 1999, p. 3; R. Norton-
Taylor. 'US sells half the world's arms exports', id., 20 October 2000, p. 19 (80"10 of
the world's weapons are sold by the D.S.. Britain, and France).
2aggresston.s and (b) envisages a smooth transition into independence or self-
government of former colonial or trust terntortes.s
The purpose of this discussion, however. is to explore the extent to which a greater
reliance on terror-war risks the collapse of 'rules' of war. An interesting aspect of
modem armed conflicts is the importance increasingly given to the use of terror as
a type of weapon. as new technologies permit considerations of efflctency-In-resulte
to outweigh more traditional wartime guidelines of proportionality and military
necesstty.s There is also abundant evidence that any sense of shared values in
relation to the conduct of terror-war may be more illusory than real. For example.
the internet simultaneously quickens the speed of communications. and lessens
the Importance of state territory. The changed nature of warfare produced by early
twentieth century industrialisation effectively removed much protection for civilian
workers, who became those first targeted; the communications revolution similarly
places in some doubt the degree to which perceptions of legitimacy regarding
'lawful' means and methods of warfare still exist. The terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York, and on the Pentagon in
Washington, D.e., illustrate well the consequences of the mis-use of any new
3 U.N. Charter, Article 2(4)
4 U.N. Charter, Chapters XI, XII, XIll. See, e.g.. E.A.l.alng, The Norm of Self-
Determination, 1941- 1991 11993) 22 C.W.I.L.J. 209. However, the fact of wars to
achieve the self-determination ofpeoples points rather to the short-sightedness of
such an approach.
5 The desirability ofan 'effectiveness test' is put forth by D. Meltzer, Lecturer in
Law, University of Kent, In an abstract of a presentation paper delivered Spring
2002, in the possession of the author.
6 As codified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick In Armed Forces In the Field (First
Convention), for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shtpwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Convention), Relative to the
Trealment of Prtsoners of War (Third Convention), and Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons In TIme of War (Fourth Convention. See also the 1977 Protocols I
and 2 additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection
of victims of international, and non-international, armed conflicts, respectively,
and the residue of Hague law, from the Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
3technology. the sheer openness of access to which now must give much cause for
concem.?
To what extent can a 'war on global terror' be a 'war' at all? The origins of today's
laws and/or rules ofwar lie predominantly in the nineteenth century, in the period
somewhat after the occurrence of several Western national liberation wars. S The
entrepreneurial spirit unleashed via such wars« sought then to systematise
warfare, in the sense of ensuring In advance certain levels of predictability of
action. Steady industrialisation led to increasing calls in the West for the
curtailment or restraint of the new economic competition in armaments. and the
new ways of waging war such weaponry facilitated. IQ Inter-governmental
conferences were held to negotiate the prohibition of certain weapons and to
ensure m1nimallevels of humanitarian treatment during war.n While this
encouraged the outbreak of war, if only because certain rules of play were now
agreed In advance, such negotiated reciprocity did work to the ultimate benefit of
industrialised states by helping to ensure the matertal survival of each. For
example. and as noted in the Preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration to
renounce the use of exploding projectiles under 400 grammes weight.» 'the only
7 In retatlon to the attacks of 11 September 2001, see, e.g.. V.N.S.C. Resolutions
1377, 1373 and 1368 (2001), 1333 (2000), 1269 and 1267 (1999).
8 For a discussion of the 'nation in arms' as tribal warfare. see G. Best, War and
Society In Revolutionary Europe 1770 - 1870 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998),
pp. 252 - 256.
• Cf. the discussion on this point by 1..1. and R.H. Rudolph. The Modernity of
Tradition', in The Developing Nations: What path to modernization? (F. Tachau,
ed.) (Chicago: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 41, 44.
10 See, e.g., E. Chadwick, 'Neutrality's Last Gasp? The Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913' in Traditional Neutrality Revisited: Law, Theory, and Case Studies (The
Hague: K1uwerLaw International, 2002), at p. 59.
11 ProfessorTrainln notes that between 1815 and 1910. there were 148 different
International meetings to codify the laws and customs of war. Ninety of these
meetings were held in the first ten years ofthe twentieth century. I.P. Trainln,
'Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law ofWar' [1946140 A.J.I.L. 534, 536 n. 2.
12 Reprinted in A. Roberts and R. Guellf (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War
(Oxford: O.V.P., 3d ed. 2002), at p. 54.
4legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish durtng war is to
weaken the military forces of the enemy'. This is a very limited war objective,
indeed.
What is also striking. although perhaps less so, in the early development of rules of
war is a heavy emphasis on contractual relations. For example. the participation,
or si omnes, clause found in Hague Convention IVof 1907, Article 2. on the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, states that '{t)he provisions contatned in the
Regulations referred to in Article 1. as well as in the present Convention. do not
apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are
parties to the Convention'.» Moreover, the early instruments to codify restraint
durtng armed conflict rest upon two basic premises; proportionality. and military
necessity. 14 The protection of civilians and other non-combatants is perhaps the
most noticeable fringe benefit of such confines.
In contrast to this original reciprocity in agreement, and the utilitarian approach to
limited war aims, eVidence is available increasingly of a fracturing of shared values
in relation to war and the waging of war. New war aims have left the limited
objectives of 1868 far behind in time and spirit. The expectation of a terror
element today needs addressing now, for as one commentator has remarked,
'terrorism is total war: the end justifies all means'. IS WhUe naturally a sense of
solidarity exists among the world's states In relation to the 11 September attacks
13 For example, Hague Convention IV of 1907 was technically without binding force
during World War 1 because signatories Serbia and Montenegro had not ratifled it.
Ail the belligerents were hound to Hague Convention iI of 1899 until 8 August
1917, G, Werner, 'Les prlsonnlers de guerre' (1928)21 Recueil des Cours 5, 96 n.
3, citing the Bulletin International des Societes de ia Crolx-Rouge {1918), pp. 25-
26,
14 J, Strawson. 'international law at ground zero' 120011 34 S,L.R 52 (strict
adherence to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 required).
15 H.-P. Gasser, 'Prohibition of terrorist acts in international humanitarian law'
(July-August 1986) 68 (253) I.RR.C. 200 (offprint, page 5), Of interest, the Vlenna-
based U,N. Terrorism Prevention Branch, a branch of the U,N. Office for Drug
Control and Crime Prevention, researches and investigates such trends in
terrorism.
5on the U.S., laws of war are effective only when they rest upon reciprocal
restraint, 16 and the perpetration ofterroIist acts upends this foundation. There is
also on-going controversy regarding a satisfactory definition of 'terrorism' or
'terrortsr.v It can of course be difficult to distinguish between 'licit'. and 'illicit'
violence during a war, IS but any 'shared' sense of human values in relation to the
precise way in which a present-day or future war against 'terror' must, or should.
be waged, Is difficult to discern, The pursuit of power through force Is where the
danger of the breakdown in consensus in relation to restraint in warfare in general
becomes clearest. 19
16 However. see infra notes 56 and 65, and accompanying text.
17 The formula frequently adopted by the U,N, rests along the lines of the following:
'deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism in
all Its forms .:', See, e.g.. U,N,S,C. Resolution 1044 (31 January 1996),
S/RES/1044 (1996). However, see also Council of the European Union, Common
Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat
terrortsm (2001/931/CFSP), tu which 'terrortst act' is defined in Article 3, and the
perpetrators Identified tu the Annex; l. Black, 'EU signs deal to freeze assets', The
Guardian 29 December 2001, p. 12. Cf. M. Wells, World Service will not call US
atiacks "terrorism". id" 15 November 2001, p. 9 (a 'subjective term').
18 H,-P, Gasser. supra note 15, P. 6, See A. Roberts. 'Crisis at Kunduz', The
Guardian, 24 November 200 I, p. 20 (the war tu Afghanistan 'is an
internationalised civil war'): R Willing. K. .Johnson. and M. Kasindorf. "'Poor fellow"
can expect little sympathy', USA TODAY, 20 December 2001, p. lOA (choices in
jurtsdlction for the trial of American Tallban member John Walker Undh).
10 It was quickly argued that '[tlhe events of II September have set tu motlon a
significant loosening of the legal constraints on the use of force', Comment, Byers,
'Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 September' [20021 51
l.e.L.O. 401, 414. Cr. C.J. Chivers and D. Rohde, 'Afghan Camps Turn Out Holy
WarGuerrillas and Terrorists', New York Times (online). accessed at
http://www.nytlmes.com/2002/03/ 18/internatlonal/asia/ 18DOCU.html ('a eo-
ordtuated mix of firepower is one mark of a capable military force'); E. Hobsbawm,
'War and peace', The Guardian [Saturday Review), 23 February 2002, p. 3 ('the
past lOOyears changed the nature of war').
6Drawn together through religion. ideology. and/or a sense of shared grievance. the
'new enemy' is 'stateless' in the sense of geographical localisation.20 The emergence
of new technologies permits their world-wide link-Up.21 Modern conununications
systems facilitate the pooling of resources, the exchange of information. and the co-
ordination ofviolence. Such qualitative advantages are in turn easily contrasted
with the more traditional approach to waging war reflected in the Geneva
instruments. The so-called 'new enemy' is characterised moreover by a readiness
to utilise anything to hand, such as a civilian aircraft. to destroy chosen targets
and to inflict widespread psychological terror. Not for the 'new enemy' the laws and
customs of traditional warfare, the Geneva Conventions. or human rights, nor the
confines of state sovereignty, constitutional-democratic regulation, or market
rules.22
As so-called 'new enemies' emerge.as therefore, the international laws of war may
prove increasingly inadequate, or inapproprtate. Similarly. gaps exist in the
piecemeal approach adopted through offence-specific anti-terror codmcations.a- It
20 Cf. L. Brilmayer, 'Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation'
11991J 16 Yale J.lnt'l. L. 177. See G. Galloway. 'Harbingers of death in the Gulf,
The Guardian, 20 November 2001. p. 18 (the network ofls1amist terrorists are said
to 'be ensconced in 50 countries'); 'How bin Laden network spread its tentacles',
The Observer. 20 January 2002, p. 5 (al-Queda links from Brighton to Bolton).
21 See. e.g .. P. Eedle, 'Terrorism.corn', The Guardian IG2), 17 July 2002. p. 4 (al-
Queda weberte. run by the Centre for Islamic Studies and Research, is part of its
'strategy of total war with America').
22 See A. Gresh, The rules ofwar'. Le Monde Diplomatique/The Guardian Weekly,
September 1999, p. 1 (the importance of the relationship between war. law and
morality).
23 M. Blshara, 'L'ere des conflits asymetriquee', Le Monde Diplomatique, October
2001, p. 20. Cf. M. Freedman, 'Face it - there is a war on', The Observer, 18
November 2001. p. 9 (dangers to multi-national corporations of asynunetric
warfare tactics).
Z4 For example, U.N. treaties against international terrorism include: the Tokyo
Convention of 1963 on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, The Hague Convention of 1970 for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
AIrcraft, the Montreal Convention of 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
7is thus intended in this discussion to explore the dynamics which today underpin
the use of war for economic purposes. the rhetoric in support of which encourages
a reliance on terror for advantage. The structure of this discussion is as follows.
First. a short general background is given to the laws of armed conflict. Emphasis
is placed on the economic advantages of reciprocity. A contemporary environment
In which terror Is employed by globally-based groups to undennlne previously-
agreed limits is the next step of inquiry. It remains a point of conjecture
throughout that the emergence of a new approach to war raises a double-faced.
and ghastly spectre: the spread cost of terror-war risks the collapse of restraint in
relation both to war. and peacethne civilian governance. alike."
against the Safety of Civil Aviation and the Montreal Protocol of 1988 for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at AIrports Serving International Civil
Aviation. the New York Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the
New York Convention of 1979 against the Taking of Hostages, the Vienna
Convention of 1980 on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Rome
Convention of 1988 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation and the Rome Protocol of the same year for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of FIxed Platforms located on the Continental
Shelf. the Montreal Convention of 1991 on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection, the New York Convention of 1997 for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings. and the New York Convention of 1999 for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism. The Legal Committee of the U.N.G.A. has been working
on a convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and a
comprehensive convention on the elimination of terrorism.
25 See, e.g., E. Chadwick, 'Terrorism and the law: Historical contexts,
contemporary dilemmas. and the end(s) of democracy' [1996/97J26(4) Crime. Law
and Social Change 329; Editorial. 'Eavesdropping plan opens door to government
abuses'. USATODAY. 26 December 2001. p. lOA; G. Monbtot, The Taliban of the
west'. The Guardian. 18 December 2001, p. 15; P. Beaumont, 'Strawattacks
Mngabe for threats to journalists', The Observer. 25 November 2001. p. 11
(Mugabe engineers a state of emergency); M. Woollacott, The world six months on'.
The Guardian. II March 2002. p. 13 (world-wide passage of draconian anti-
terrorist laws); B. Ackerman, 'Don't Panic'. London Review of Books. 7 February
2002. p. 15; M. Engel. 'US court balks al new spy powers'. The Guardian. 24
82. War Laws - A Brief Overview.
Assuming an armed conflict is characterised by open violence and the use of the
military, it becomes self-evident that the laws of war are applicable to a systematic
campaign of terrorist acts carried out by an ascertainable group of non-state
actors.ae While it is well beyond the scope of the present discussion to outline the
subject and detail of the operative laws of armed confltct.ar the contractual basis of
reciprocal rules of restraint is of prime importance to their effectiveness.
A. The Regulation of 'Industrial' War.
The community of nations which formulated the early customs and principles of
the modem laws of armed conflict consisted mainly of nineteenth century 'civilised'
Western states. One notable exception was Japan. which was nonetheless a state
with a samurai, or warrior code, tradttton.as An overview of the European origins of
the laws and customs of western warfare thus must be taken into account, and is
succinctly given in the British Military Manual of 1914, as follows:
August 2002, p. 17 (little-known D.S. foreign intelligence surveillance court rejects
justice department application to loosen government controls governing searches
and wtretaps).
26 See Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Article 3 of
Protocol 1. See also O. Burkeman, 'U.S. considers assassination squads', The
Guardian, 13 August 2002, p. 2 (senior U.S. army advisers view missions to
assassinate al-Queda leaders as "'preparation of the battlefield" in a war against
terrorism that has no boundaries because the September 11 terrorist attacks in
effect initiated a world-wide state of armed conflict').
27 A good source for the texts of the relevant treaties is A. Roberts and R. Guelff
(eds.), supra note 12. Addltlonal documents may also be found in D. Scbindler
and J. Toman [ede.], The Laws of AImed Conflict (Lelden: StJtholf, 1973),
28 E.g.. Japan acceded to the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law on
30 October 1886, and fully participated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and
1907.
9In antiquity and In the earlier part of the Middle Ages no such rules of
warfare existed: the practice of warfare was unsparingly cruel and the
discretion of the commanders was legally in no way limited. DUring the
latter part of the Middle Ages. however, the Influences of Chtistlanlty as weli
as of Chivalry made themselves fell and gradually the practice of warfare
became less savage ....29
The development of rules of war resulted from the slow accretion of practical. and
ad hoc, agreements made between the participants in particular wars. Dating
roughly from the discovery of the New World, attention began to focus gradually on
the regulation of war rather than on the reasons for its occurrence. or its
Justness'.30 In time. this was reflected in a contractual approach to the
codification of certain rules. particularly those applicable to particular weapons. or
military practices. For example. armaments were mutually prohibited by the St.
Petersburg Declaration of 1868. and Hague Declarations 2 and 3 of 1899. Army
and/or navy practices were harmonised by the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and
1800, the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856, and various of the
13 Hague Conventions of 1907.
The respective conferences involved tough negotiation. and what certainly had
emerged by the early twentieth century was a new scepticism regarding the
'humanitarian' purpose of the new codifications; allegations of 'sentimentality'
permitted only a limited progress.er In turn. the approach taken in construing
these agreements was strict. Each codification had to be agreed upon by the
Powers.32 could be subsequently denounced, and was applicable only in a war in
29J.E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheirn, Land Warfare: An Exposition of the Laws and
Usages of War on Land. for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army (London:
H.M.S.O.• 1914), Paragraph I.
30 See. e.g., E. Castren, The Present Law ofWar and Neutrality (Helsinki: Academia
Sclentiarum Fennica, 1954). p. 12; J. von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of
the Just War In international Law' [1939J 33 AJ.l.L. 665.
31 For a discussion of this point. see l.P. Traintn, supra note 11. pp. 544 - 550.
32 For example, the British Military Manual of 1914. Paragraph 6, notes: 'ltlf one
Power had not agreed to a particular article of any convention, that article would
10
which all engaged belligerent states were parties to it. This contractual approach
to the obligations contained in tnternationallaws of war was not, therefore. without
controversy. For example. neo-Hegeltan views in vogue in Germany by the late
nineteenth century rather undermined what had been perceived as consensus
regarding treaty obligations. As discussed by Carty, the underlying premise was
that
States did not need to seek objective standards of behaviour outside
themselves. Self-determination means that the State as a subject
determines its conduct from values within itself. The German jurist was
convinced that the convergence of theory and practice was complete in
modem German history. The theoretical groundwork for the overthrow of a
European public law based on treaties came from Ranke and Hegel.
Bismarck put it into practice.»
What was in issue was the theoretical unsustainability of any analogy between the
obligations inherent in municipal law contracts and international treaties.
International restrictions such as those applicable during war could not plausibly
be characterised as law. the thesis ran. Coupled with a superficial reading of the
Clausewitzian view of war as 'a mere continuation of (peace-time) policy by other
means'j- the resulting dialectical theory of war escalation proved encouraging to
those who disparaged laws of war as of sentimental value only. Individual state
contracts (e.g.. treaties) could be based neither on a higher law, nor provide the
foundation for any universal law. as such law simply did not exist. States' rights
instead were actualisable only through the individual will of each. A state which
could not harmonise its individual political will with that of other states must settle
not be binding on the other belligerents although they might have contracted to
accept it'. J .E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheim, supra note _29.
33 A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? (Manchester: M.U.P.. 1986). p. 76
(citations omitted). This passage is taken from a discussion of Kaufmann, Des
Wesen des Volkerrechts und die Clausula rebus sic stantibus (1911), and other
related works.
34 C.M. von Clausewttz, On War (1832) IHannondsworth: Penguin. 1968. A.
Rapoport, ed.]. Book I. Ch. 1. Paragraph 24. p. 119.
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the matter by war. In this way, war could change the law.ae The effect of this was
to make the obligations contained. e.g., in Hague law and military usage somewhat
a matter of self-regulation. and hence. of political sett-tnterest.ee This viewpoint,
coupled with a strict approach to the participation, or si onmes clause found in
Hague Convention N of 1907, effectively undermined even the spirit of reciprocity
in restraint - a result fully in evidence during World War 1.
It can also be said that the laws of war have always been, to some extent,
controversial in regard to their actual content. as
The laws of war consist partly of customary rules. which have grown up in
practice. and partly ofWIitten rules, that is. rules which have been
purposely agreed upon by the Powers in international treaties. Side by side
with these customary and written laws of war there are in existence. and are
still growing. usages concerning warfare. While the laws of war are legally
binding. usages are not. and the latter can therefore. for sufficient reasons
be disregarded by belhgerents, Usages have. however. a tendency gradually
to harden into legal rules of warfare, and the greater part of the present laws
of war have grown up in that way.er
This nineteenth century world in which the laws and customs of warfare evolved
was. moreover. characterised by the evolution of latssez-fatre capitalism and
imperialism. The corresponding monopolisation of the twin forces of production
and capital implicated concurrent developments in arms technology as well as
efforts to codify humane measures of restraint in the means and methods of
warfare; 'the increasing inter-dependence between these states, and the escalation
of warfare. created an objective need for written rules conunon to the whole
35 A. Carty. supra note 33. p. 77. citing H. von Treltschke, Politik, Band 2 (1900).
pp. 544 - 547. Carty also notes that these views rested on Romantic concepts of
identity. and the idea of states existing in a state of nature.
36 This view is to be contrasted with an equally contemporaneous view of
international law as 'the empiIically identifiable product of the political will of
states'. Book Review, Reisman, 'Lassa Oppenheim's Nine Lives' [1994) Yale
J.lnt'I.L. 255, 264.
37 J,E. Edmonds and L, Oppenheim. supra note 29, Paragraph 2.
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communfty'cae Reciprocity in restraint was to the ultimate benefit ofindustrialised
states, and it is therefore not entirely surprising that the more long-term interests
of state survival among industrtalised states should be reflected in the Hague and
Geneva instruments. Generally viewed as beginning with the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaratton.ae the codifications negotiated before World War 1 were drafted by
those 'civilised' capitalist states which possessed a degree of parity in
(tndustrtaltsed) armaments. and focused largely on specific weapons, or modes of
military behavtour.w
B. 'Civilised'!,Unclvi1ised' Enemies.
As for developments after World War 1, the argument was variously made« that
the war deterrence and collective security provisions contained in the Covenant of
the League of Nations42 had not obviated the rationale for up-dating the laws of
war. On the other hand, and as noted by Kunz, two basic arguments were put
against this position: '[tlhe flrst group of arguments consists in saying that laws of
war are impossible; war can only be abolished, not regulated. Further, they are
valueless. for they will be brokenv
38 A. Rosas, The Legal Status of PIisoners of War: A Study in International
Humanitarian Law Applicable In AImed Confllcts (Helsinki: Suoroalainen
tiedeakatemla, 1976), p. 82. See also Id., pp. 2, and 28.
39 Customary practice was reflected 10 Lieber's Code. which was promulgated by
U.S. President Lincoln, and adopted by the U.S. War Department on 24 April 1863.
as a written code of land warfare for the Northern, or Union, troops, during the
American Civil War.
40 See, e.g., the list of agreements considered relevant to the milltary forces 10
1914,lnJ.E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheim, supra note 29, Paragraph 4.
41 See, e.g., J.L. Kunz, 'The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent
Necessity for Their Revision', [19511 45A.J.I.L. 37, 38- 40,43- 44,46- 49,51 -
52.
42 League of Nations Covenant, as amended, [19191 225 C.T.S.. at p. 195. Nineteen
out of twenty-six articles 10 the Covenant were devoted to the new 'peace
programme'.
43 J.L. Kunz, supra note 41. p. 44.
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The result was that conferences continued. views were aired, and agreements such
as they were« remained on a contractual footing. As every law student soon finds
out, however, munlclpal law contracts have a number of formal requirements, one
of which is that there must be the requisite intent, or 'meeting of the minds',
Further indicative of the notional contractual analogy in relation to the laws and
customs of warfare was an acknowledged non-applicability of these rules to
'uncivilised' peoples. This non-applicability is stated in the 1914 Brttish Military
Manual baldly. as follows:
It must be emphasised that the rules of International Law apply only to
warfare between civilised nations. where both parties understand them and
are prepared to cany them out. They do not apply in wars with uncivilised
states and tribes. where their place is taken by the discretion of the
commander and such rules ofjustice and humanity as recommend
themselves in the particular circumstances of the case.45
This statement is expanded upon by Colby, in pertinent part. as follows:
[I]t is a fact that against uncivilised people who do not know international
law and do not observe it. and would take advantage of one who did. there
must be something else. The "something else" should not be a relaxation of
all bonds of restraint. But It should be a clear understanding that this Is a
different kind of war, .... Ferocity and ruthlessness are not essential; but it
is essential to recognise the different character of the people and their usual
44 See. e.g.. the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating. Poisonous or Other Gases. and of Bactertological Methods of
Warfare. in force 8 February 1928. Earlier treaties prohibiting the use of gases
were the 1899 Hague Declaration. the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Article 171. and
the 1922 Washington Treaty. Article 5. D. Schlndler and J. Toman (eds.). supra
note 27. p. 109.
45 [Emphasis added.] J.E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheim. supra note 29. Paragraph
7.
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lack of discIirnination between combatants and non-combatants, in their
own as well as in enemy personnel.46
Colby further remarks that 'the distinction is not one of Christianity and paganism.
It is a distinction of wartare',« justified on the basis that 'excessive humanitarian
ideas should not prevent harshness against those who use harsh methods. for in
being over-kind to one's enemies, a commander is simply being unkind to his own
people',48
In short. early developments in the laws of war reflect an objective
acknowledgement that 'civilised' states needed to observe practical restraints on a
reciprocal basis in order to guarantee their mutual survival. As remarked by G.
Abt-Saab.
The si omnes clause reflects a certain search for symmetry in restraints
Imposed on parties to a conflict, to avoid any tampering with tbe military
balance. i.e.• disadvantage as a result of betng a party to the tnstrument. In
other words. the instruments were based on the assumption of reciprocity
between all the parties to the conflict and applied only as far and as long as
this reciprocity was operattve.w
Those rules which were developed were based in turn on agreements which did
not. and could not. provide for every conttngency. As stated tn tbe Preamble of
Hague Convention IV. of 1907.
46 E. Colby, supra note I, p. 287. Cf. T. Shanker, 'NATO must attack terrorists
before tbey hit. Rumsfeld says'. NewYork TImes [online], 6 June 2002. accessed at
http/ /www.nytimes.com/2002/06/06/tntematlonal/06CND-NATO.html(NATO
'must take the war on terrorism to the terrorists by pre-emptive attacks on
shadowy networks or hostile states').
47 E. Colby, supra note I. p. 283.
46 Id.. p. 285.
49 G. Abi-Saab, 'The specificities of humanitarian law'. in Studies and essays on
international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles (The Hague: Martinus
NIJhoff. 1984). pp. 265. 266.
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It has not, however, been found possible at present to concert regulations
coveIing all the circumstances which mise in practice; ...
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued. the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, In cases not Included
in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations. as they result from the usages established among civilised peoples.
from the laws of humanity. and the dictates of the public consctence.sc
However. and as noted earlier, even when some level of consensus was achieved,
agreed restraints could be renounced. observed in piecemeal fashion. and applied
only if all the participants in a particular war were party to the particular
codtftcauon.ei Naturally, the unwrttten customs and usages of warfare often
provided gap-flllers of substantial benefit to the perceived dictates of restraint and
humanity. and transgressions could always be met by reprisals, Thus, reciprocity
in the observance of rules of wartime restraint provides the key to their
applicability: only In wars In which there was, or could be, a 'meeting of the minds'
was there evidence of the form, ifnot the substance, of applicable rules.
C, A Meeting of Minds?
Accordingly, the issue of rectprcctty-In-Iact provides further answers in relation to
those wars in which rules of war will. or even can, apply. For example, the
emergence of a 'different kind of war'. such as that in Chechnya, or more recently,
50 (Emphasis added.] Also called the 'Martens Clause', this Is modified In Protocol
1 of 1977 as follows: 'civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of International law derived from established custom,
from the prtnciples of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience'.
(Emphasis added.]
51 The general participation clause was modernised in Geneva law in 1949. Article
2(3) common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 states in pertinent part:
'(a)lthough one of the Powers In conllict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound- by it in their
mutual relations'.
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against the Taliban/al-Queda in Afghanistan. must affect the observance of rules
of wartime restraint. In practical terms, a 'different kind of war' meant traditionally
that the gloves came off, and there certainly could be no requirement to observe
rules of war in relation to 'less advanced' cultures. at least until or unless some
level of reciprocity-ill-fact was in evidence. However. this basic premise - which
naturally goes to the heart of more organic developments in the laws of war - was
provided against, if only in a spirit of humanltarianlsm, by Geneva law in 1864,
1906, 1929, 1949, and in 1977.52 Specifically, the reciprocity refiected In the
participation, or si omnes clause was modernised in Article 2(3) common to the
four Geneva Conventions, in order to make humanitartanism universal. As noted
in The Commentary (I), reciprocity had now been discarded as a pre-condition:
Treaties of humanitarian law do not constitute an engagement concluded on
a basis of reciprocity. binding each party to the contract only insofar as the
other party observes its obligations. It Is rather a eertes of unilateral
engagements solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the
other Contracting Parties.53
It is also of interest that the up-dating of Geneva law in 1977 in relation to Protocol
1 was due in large part to the phenomenon of wars of national liberation, or for the
self-determination of peoples.ss There was perceived a real need in particular to
52 See also, inter alia. the lists of prohibited weaponry in so-called Hague law.
53 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field. CommentaIy (J.S. Plctet, ed.) (Geneva: l.C.R.C.. 1952),
p.25.
54 Protocol!, Article 1(4), applies to 'armed conflicts In which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their light of self-determination .. .'. At the time, this was viewed
conservatively as applying only to South Africa and Israel. See, e.g., J, Gardam.
'Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions: A Victim of Short-Sjghted Political
Conslderations?'11989117 Melbourne U.L.R. 107. See also 'Conference on
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinions 1 - 10 on Questions arising from the
Dtssolution of Yugoslavia 11 I January and 4 July 19921, Opinions 2 and 3',
reprinted in 119921 31 l.L.M. 1488, 1497 - 1498, and 1499 - 1500, respectively.
Cf. U.N.G.A. Resolution 46/88, 16 December 1991, accessed at
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bring such armed conflicts within the 'grave breaches' regime of Geneva law. in
order that atrocities could be prosecuted anywhere.ee As stated in The
Commentarr on the Additional Protocols,
Thus reciprocity invoked as an agreement not to fulfil the obligations of
humanitartan law is prohibited, but this does not apply to the type of
reciprocity which couid be termed "positive", by wWch the Parties mutually
encourage each other to go beyond what is laid down by humanitarian law. 56
Nevertheless, tn the present 'war on global terrorism' a fundamental dilemma has
been exposed. The international laws of war apply in relation to international
armed conflicts engaged tn by the High Contracting Parties. or tn 'all cases of
partiai or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party'. 57 While
there is general consensus that members of the Taliban captured in Mghanistan do
qualify for prisoner-of-war status, there has been great controversy regarding the
precise status of captured members of al-Quecta. 58 particularly as the al-Queda
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r088.htm. wWch '[rle-afftrms [...1
the universal realisation of the right of all peoples. including those under colonial.
foreign and allen domtnation. to seif-determtnation .;'. (Emphasis added.J
Protocol I also supplements and expands on more traditional rules regarding new
weaponry, the proportionality of the use of force. and those persons entitled to use
it.
55 First Convention, Article 49; Second Convention. Article 50; Third Convention,
Article 129: Fourth Convention, Article 146: Protocoi 1, Article 85(1).
56 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Y. Sandoz, C, Swtnarskt. and B, Zimmerman. eds.)
(Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff. i987. p. 37.
57 Article 2 conunon to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Protocol 1 makes
reference to Common Article 2. and mereiy adds. in Article 1(41. an additional type
of armed conflict - that of the self-determination of peoples. This is however
construed conservatively. See supra note 54. and accompanying text.
58 See. e.g.. P. Beaumont. 'American cant'. The Observer, 13 January 2002. p. 25
(Bush advisers say captured ai-Queda 'are men who fought without uniforms.
They bore their weapons in secret for a criminal organisation without a fonnallegal
command. They are criminals. "unlawful combatants", and therefore are not
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cult is 'stateless' to the extent it is 'globally' based. The extent to which members of
al-Queda can be viewed as lawful combatants to which the protections of Geneva
law can attach is thus highly problematic.59 With consistent V.S. opposition to the
recognition of 'terrorists' as lawful combatants,60 and fears of a new Amertcan
'unilateralism' emergmg,» it is to be doubted to what extent, if any. an
organisation such as al-Queda could ever qualify as a group to which the laws of
war can attach.se
covered by the protections of the Geneva Conventions'). Contra A. Roberts, supra
note 18; Editortal, 'Captive injustlce', The Guardian, 29 December 2001, p. 17; A
Gillan, 'Mother loses Guantanamo Bay court challenge', id .. 16 March 2002, p. 8.
Cf. Protocol I, Article 43, The V,S, has never ratified Protocol 1.
59 However, Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 states: '[t]he
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
Convention in all circumstances'.
60 H,-P, Gasser, 'Agora: the V.S. Decision not to Ratify Protocol 1 to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victlms', (1987J 81 AJ,I.L. 912; Comment,
Meron, The Thne Has Come for the V,S. to RaWY Geneva ProtocolI' (19941 88
AJ,1.L. 678,
61 See, e.g., N.A. Lewts. 'U.S. rejects all support for new court on atrocities', New
York Thnes (online), 7 May 2002, acressed at
http//www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/intemational/07TRIB.html (the Bush
administration has formally renounced support for the International Criminal
Court, and indicated its intention 'to relieve the U.S. of obligations under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' of 1969), See also M, Byers, The World
according to Cheney, Rice and Rumsfeld', (21 February 2002J London Review of
Books 14,
62 In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
V,SA), Mertts, l.C,J, Reporls 1986, Paragraph, 220, the Court notes that the V,S.
was obliged 10 'respect and ensure respect' for the Geneva Conventions, which
obligation is derived 'from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the
Conventions merely give specific expression'. See R. Abt-Saab, 'The "General
Principles" of humanitarian law according to the International Court of Justice'
(July-August 198711.R.RC. (offprtnt).
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This potential non-applicability in fact, if not strictly speaktng In theory, reflects
not only a recognition that a 'different kind of war', a 'stateless' war, is existent.
What is also reflected is a changed nature of waging a war driven by a
technologically sophisticated 'new enemy'.63 This in turn gives rise to a further
issue: that, despite the real progress made throughout the twentieth century In
achieving consensus to prohibit aggression, and to outlaw particular modes of
attack and weaponry. what may be termed 'the larger objectives ofwar'64 have
begun once again to outweigh previously-agreed 'mutual survival compacts', In
other words. any shared sense that war must. or should. be waged 'humanely' in
all circumstances appears to be crumbllng,65 Such rules as have been developed
are no longer 'understood', mutually, by all the participants in these new 'stateless'
wars. The question whether or not 'their place is taken by the discretion of the
commander and such rules of justice and humanity as reconunend themselves in
the particular circumstances of the case' ,66 then becomes something of a moot
point, particularly as reciprocity is no longer a legal pre-condition. Rather, more
and more armed confltctsev are termed struggles against 'terrorists', at which point
domestic criminal laws are much more likely to be applied.68
63 M, Btshara, supra note 23. See, e.g, J, Borger and E. MacAskill, 'Black market
means bin Laden may already have a "dirty" nuclear bomb', The Guardian, 7
November 2001, p, 3.
... E, Colby, supra note 1, p, 284,
65 For the I.C.RC.'s view of the words 'in all circumstances', see The Commentary
on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977, supra note 56, pp. 37 - 38, A bare
minimum of humanitarian rules is provided in Article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions. Strictly speaking, conunon Article 3 applies 'in the case of
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties',
66 J,E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheim, supra note 29, Paragraph 7.
67 Assuming, once again, that an armed conflict is characterised by open violence
and the use of the military,
68 The danger then becomes differential treatment, and where convicted, different
sentencing practice. See M. Engel, supra note 25 (V.S, 'Patriot Act' provides
loophole 'to switch information collected under loose rules that govern the war on
terrorism to normal criminal cases'). Of interest, see C. Stlverman, 'An Appeal to
the U.N.: Terrorism Must Come Within the Jurisdiction of an International
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3. An Economic Rationale.
Professor Trainin, writing after World War 2 on the reform of intemationallaws of
war, notes, first. that such laws undoubtedly exist. Secondly. and more precisely,
he adds: 'attention should be directed to a clarification of what that law represents.
what constitutes its economic base. and the interests and wishes of what class or
group within that class are reflected in that law'. 69 Such an analytical approach,
while belonging perhaps to an older era and formed from within a different political
context, Is of particular Interest nonetheless when considering the extent to which
intemationallaws of armed conflict can or should be applied in a 'war on global
terrorism'. For example. if viewed from the perspective of what the laws of war
represent, the answer is relatively clear - the laws of war represent a political
attempt to harmonise concepts of proportionality and mllitary necessity In order to
ensure certain outcomes. or, at least. guidelines, of predictability in the use of
armed force. As stated in the Preamble of Hague Convention rv in the context of
the Martens Clause.tv '". the High Contracttog Parties clearly do not Intend that
unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the
arbitrary judgement of military commanders'.
Of course, the laws of war still reflect the period of history in which they were
lnltialiy drafted, Wars were deemed 'legal' for alilntents and purposes at the time,
Moreover, as the politics of industrial latssez-fatre expansionism facilitated
alterations in social structures, the masses began to participate more in public life;
pressure increased on governments to pursue measures of 'Christian' restraint. In
turn, this produced a two-tiered approach when assessing the economic basis of,
or background to, laws of war. First, and in relation to laws agreed by 'civilised'
peoples, there was the need for 'contractual' reciprocity, in order to prevent the
complete destruction of an industrialised enemy; limited war aims reflected a
CIimlnal Court' (1997). accessed at
gopher:/ /gopher,igc,apc,org/OO/orgs/icc/ngodocs/terroIislIl-silverman,txt la
comparison of U.S., Iranian, and Cuban criminal justice systems in relation to air
piracy and hijackers),
69 LP, Tratntn, supra note 11. p. 535,
70 Supra text accompanying note 50.
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fundamental concern that complete destruction would prove counter-productive in
relation to the gains to be acquired through victory. On the other hand, the
position in relation to 'civilised' peoples stands in contrast to the treatment meted-
out to 'savages', regarding which the British Military Manual of 1914,71 as quoted
above, was so succinct - the commander in the field was to use his own discretion.
In other words, the use of field discretion in relation to the 'uncivilised' reflected a
'different kind of war', and hence, a different economic rationale to the laws of war.
Ultimate governmental control and responsibility was required only when dealing
against another 'civilised' state.
There Is naturally a self-protective function in the distinction just highlighted, as
was noted earuer.» An army would be foolish to observe non-reciprocated legal
niceties, but also exposed is an attitude that subjugated, colonial peoples, for
instance, were potentially of less 'worth' than their Christian cousins - a distinction
which carrtes with it both economic and political undertones. The economic worth
of the 'uncivilised' was generally to be found in vast stores of raw materials; their
political worth, for the most part, was in the material acquisition. This leads, in
turn, to a consideration of the final step in Professor Traintn's approach: the class
interests and wishes reflected in the law. Put another way, 'in whose interests and
for the sake of what it (the war) was fought',73 This Juxtaposition ellcits a certain
choice in response. Taking the given economic and political considerations into
account, the laws of war, as lnttially developed, could be said to reflect capitalist
and Christian value systems, An alternative point of vtew can be gleaned from a
lingertng distinction between 'just' and 'unjust' wars, though the conclusion would
no doubt be much the same: the class interests of the mdustrtal-flnanclal elites of
the day - capitaltst, acquisitive - combined to promote levels of restraint in
industrial warfare which proved sufficiently congruent with perspectives of
Christian 'justness' for limited political accommodations to be pursued.
Nonetheless, such approaches do not yet address adequately the 'who' and 'why' of
the question. If the focus switches instead to a perusal of the 'industrial-fmancial
71 Paragraph 7, supra text accompanying note 45,
72 Supra note 48.
73 LP, Tratnin, supra note 11, p. 554.
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elites',74 a different framework emerges which proves relevant to traditional laws of
war and more recent developments alike.. As noted by Mandel, albeit in reference
to a different era,
In the final analysis it is the industrial-financial balance of forces, in
conjunction with the weight of political-social factors, which decides the
outcome of any conflict for a re-division of the world into colonial empires
and/or impertalist spheres of influence. Wars are precisely a mechanism for
adjusting or adapting the milltary and political balance of forces to the new
industrial-financial one ....75
In other words. the eUtes which negotiated to limit their war aims inter se were
fully mindful of the material and human losses which otherwise could occur to
make the acquisition of a post-war asset less valuable. Their 'class interests', for
want of a better phrase, ensured that they approached their industrialised wars in
an utilitarian fashton.tv Where atrocities did occur, the 1907 Hague Convention IV
on the Laws and Customs of War on Land provided for the payment of
compensation in Article 3, as follows:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation, It shall be
responsible for all acts conunitted by persons forming part of Its armed
forces.
Thus, political responsibility was engaged In relation to the 'civilised', As for the
'uncivilised', this seemed less appropriate, if only in terms of different balance-in-
outcome rewards: 'discretion', as noted earlier. was left to field commanders.
74 A phrase used by E, Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War (London:
Verso, 1986), p, 48,
75 Id.. citing statistics in H.C. Hillman, 'Comparative Strength of the Great Powers',
In Survey of International Affairs 1939 - 1946: the World In March 1939 (Toynbee
and Ashton-Gwatkln, eds.) (London, 1952).
76 Cf.. however, Professor Trainin's description of German opposition to the letter
and spirit of the Hague Conventions. l.P. Tralnln, supra note 11, pp. 546 - 551.
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In contrast. the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 instituted a system of 'grave
breaches'» in which individual responsibility is engaged. While no doubt the
product of the atrocities of Worid War 2. It could also be speculated that new
provisions for individual liability produce the perverse effect of better shielding a
political elite from ull1lnate responsibility. Be that as It may. Protocol I of 1977
extends the intemationallaws of war even further. to struggles for the self-
determination of peoples. as previously stated.r» Simultaneously. it codifies new
rules of restraint in relation to the treatment of enemy personnel and of the means
and methods of warfare. These new rules are made applicable in full to what might
once have been viewed as 'less civilised' groups, for example non-state actors who
resort to less conventional modes of fighting, e.g.. terrorist tactics, Specifically,
'within the scope of international humanitartan law, terrorism and terrortst acts
are prohibited under all circumstances. unconditionally and without exception'. 79
Nevertheless, doubts remain regarding the overall effectiveness of the new
extensions in coverage, as guerrilla fighters are in many cases simply unable to
reciprocate humanitartan treatment.ec
Assuming the 'new enemy' is highly sophisticated as well as 'stateless', what has in
fact emerged is a new type of industrial-financial elite. For example, bin Ladin is
descrtbed in the Amertcan press not only as a political force. but also as a member
of a new cosmopolitan Islamic elite. 81 'Stateless' groups such as al-Queda have
access to a world-wide resource base and offer 'integrated services'. which
nonetheless engage state territory. e.g.. for trammg, and in which to bank. Their
internal structure, like that of the modem multi-national corporation, is known to
be diffuse. Terrortst 'headquarters' can take advantage of 'convenient'
77 As deilned in Article 50, First Convention, Article 51, Second Convention. Article
130. Third Convention, and Article 147, Fourtb Convention. See also Protocol I,
Articles 11(4), and 85.
78 Article 11(4) of Protocol 1 supplements the definition of grave breaches in the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
79 H.-P. Gasser, supra note 15, p. 15.
80 On this point, see generally E. Chadwtck. Self-Determination. Terrortsm and the
International Humanitarian law of Armed Conflict (The Hague: Martinus NiJhoff
Publishers, 1996),
81 M. Blshara, supra note 23.
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jurisdictions, such as the grey zones of 'failed slales', which facilitates in practical
terms the reduction of any notional 'global accountability' to zero.se The visages of
actors which can both utilise and threaten the manifold structures of state
sovereignty are reflected in ehort-ctrcurted approaches to 'war'. This must by
definition have consequences for the observance and application of laws of war to
which, as non-state actors, the 'new enemy' does not appear to subscribe in any
case. In short, global terror groups - as a new force acting in the margins of
international regulation - may make inevitable 'lawless' wars, t.e. wars in which no
intemationallaws can be made effective. even if theoretically applicable.
4. Terrorism As War.
Regardless of whether any putative logic exists behind the recent attacks byal-
Queda on New York and Washington, D,C,," the fact remains that global
terrorism. as a social, economic, and/or political phenomenon, cannot be defined
outside of the triangular structure In which particular acts are perpetrated, In
other words, 'terrorism' - whatever its definition - generally takes the form of 'A'
attacking 'B' to achieve some objective at or with 'C'. As noted by one
commentator, 'terrortst acts are often directed at outsiders who have no direct
influence on or connection with what the terrolists seek to achieve'. 54 However, if
in fact ideology-driven terrorism constitutes a type of 'total war', it is as a war
strategy that the contextualisation of terrorism, as a 'new kind of war', becomes
cructal.es Put alternatively, if in fact 'terrorism ... raises not old questions about
82 Cf the points made by Sikka In relation to 'global' accountancy firms, P, Sikka,
"Global" dodge lets big firms off hook', The Observer (Business), 28 July 2002, p.
3. Bishara, too, makes a connection between the practice of multi-national flrms
and new terrorist actors. Btshera. supra note 23.
"See, e.g., P, Eedle, supra note 21 (the al-Queda webslte has 'laid out seven
grounds in Islamic law on which it is permissible to kill "sacrosanct infidels" -
essentially civilians').
84 H.-P. Gasser, supra note 15, p. 5.
85 See, e.g., Book Review, Wessely, 'Weapons of mass hysteria', The Guardian
(Saturday Review), 20 October 2001, p. 8 (Soviet war plans to use biological
weapons 'as the second stage of a strategic conflict'}.
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new kinds of combat but new questions about all the old fonns of war'. 86 it is
appropriately examined in relation first to rules regarding the means and methods
of warfare, and secondly in relation to status.
A. Means and Methods.
In war, the systematic terrorising of whole populations is often a strategy, and
tactic. of choice.s? Of interest. Walzer notes that
[Ilerrortsm in the strict sense, the random murder of Innocent people.
emerged as a strategy of revolutionary struggle only in the pertcd after World
War 2. that is, only after it had become a feature of conventional war. In
both cases, in war and revolution, a kind of warrior honour stood in the way
of this development. especially among professional officers and "professional
revolutionaries". The increasing use of terror by far left and ultra-nationalist
movements represents the breakdown of a political code first worked out in
the second half of the nineteenth century and roughly analogous to the laws
of war worked out at the same time. Adherence to this code did not prevent
revolutionary militants from being called terrorists, but in fact the violence
they committed bore little resemblance to contemporaty terrorism. It was
not random murder but assassination. and it involved the drawing of a line
that we will have little difficulty recognising as the political parallel of the
line that marks off combatants from non-combatants.ee
The distinction, which Walzer argues has broken down. lies, as in the laws of war,
between justifiable. and unjustifIable uses of violence; In the passage just quoted,
targeted assassination is made the point of reference. Similarly. the laws of war
B6 J,T, Burchael, 'Framing a Moral Response to Terrortsm', In International
TerroIism: CharacteIistics, Causes, Controls (C.W. Kegley, Jr.. ed.) (University of
South Carolina, 1990), p, 213, Burchael adds: 'terrorism, like the many
enlargements of savagery before it. Is a llneal descendant of traditional warfare. It
can best be understood and evaluated by analogy with conventional conflict'. Id.
87 See M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with HistoIical
lllustrations (Basic Books, 2d ed. 1992), pp. 197 - 198,
"IEmphasls added.] a, p. 198.
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distinguish between licit and illicit violence. To be licit, the use of force must be
kept within humanitarian confines, it must be proportional, and militart1y
necessazy. Civilians must not be made the object of attack. In turn, the
predictability which flows from such mutually-agreed restrictions works more to
the benefit of an utilitaIian approach to economic war aims than does any 'total
war' strategy,
Today. the breakdown of much of the traditional consensus in relation to the
lawfulness of particular means and methods of warfare is increasingly obvtous.sa
This is so for several reasons. The prohibition of inter-state aggression found in the
V.N. Charter disregards economic co-ercion.ec The changed nature of warfare has
simultaneously produced increasing levels of 'regulation', in the sense of war and
war's effects." yet a blurring of the legal concepts ofproportionaltty and military
necessity is also in evidence. 92 The combined result arguably resembles flip-sides
of the same coin. When again coupled with the asymmetry apparent in many
recent wars - the quantitative differences in equality of anus, and the balance of
material resources generally - a shift occurs in focus away from the 'moral' or
89 See. e.g.. R. Norton-Taylor. 'Taltban hit by bombs used In Vtetnam', The
Guardian, 7 November 2001, p. 4 (use of 'daisy cutter' bombs).
90 See, however, the discussion of economic sanctions, and U.N. Charter, Articles
41 and 42 by R. McLaughlin, 'Untted Nations Mandated Naval Interdiction
Operations In the Terrttortal Sea? (2002] 51 LC,L,g. 249,
" See. e.g.. the 1998 Rome Statute of the international Crtminal Court. reprtoted
in (1998]37 LL.M, 999 - 1019. in force I July 2002. Jurtsdiction extends to the
crime of genocide, climes against humanity, war crimes and the clime of
aggression. Rome Statute. Article 5(1),
92 Doctrinal disagreement persists over the legal prioritisation of specialised laws of
war, which incorporate parameters of military necessity and proportionality, and
the more general prohibition against the use of force except in self-defence, which
arguably encourages escalation. For an overview of this debate, see W.H. von
Heinegg, 'The Current State of International Prize Law', in International Economic
Law and Armed Conflict (H,H,G, Post, ed.) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp.
5,21- 25,
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humanttartanea to the economic rationale for the use of particular weaponry. The
fact that the 'new enemy' seems willing to employ any weapon to hand to kill any
member of the opposing community provides sufficient evidence, then, to conclude
that the original framework in which laws of war were developed may no longer be
of much relevance in a terror-war.
Rules must (or should) be fit for their purpose. When they are constantly
disregarded, they are either implicitly/explicitly discarded. or improved. Rule-
strengthening requires agreement. The effectiveness of rules of war requires
mutual respect for those rules. While post-war prosecutions for war crimes or
grave breaches can and do of course occur.es the damage has already been done.
In other words. the prosecution of individuals guilty of wartime atrocities. whlle
producing a valuable post-war sense of justice at one level. cannot bring back to
life those persons slaughtered, or restore the material resources destroyed by
parties to an armed conflict which neither respect nor observe the restraining laws
ofwar.
The contemporary world is well-aware of terrorist tactics employed during armed
conflicts due to their exposure in the media. Further. new developments in
modem weaponry carry with them heightened and as-yet un-ascertained dangers
(e.g.. biological and chemical weaponsl.ee So far. so similar to the late-nineteenth
century inasmuch as technological developments then were also leading to changes
in war planning. However. another parallel with that period also becomes
apparent. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were marked by
greater social mobllity within industrialised societies. yet the industrial-financial
93 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear WeapOJls 119961 I.C.J. 66. p. 226.
The W.H.O. and the U.N.G.A. requested advisory opinions in 1993 and 1994. In
response to the U.N.GA. the Court held that there was nothing in customary
intemationallaw or in conventional law which authorises or prohibits the use of
such weapons.
'4 As occurred with the International MlIitary Trtbunals (Nuremberg and Tokyo)
from 1946 to 1948. the U.S. In relation to the Vietnam War. and the establishment
of the War Crimes Tribunals for the fermer territory of Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.
95 See. e.g.. A. Gillan, 'Biologtcal weapons !Ink to a1-Queda·. The GuardIan. 16
October 2001, p. 5 (FBI seeks evidence to connect Iraq with anthrax attacks).
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elltes still contained members of the former 'warrior classes'. as in Germany with
its Prussian Junkers and, of course, elsewhere as well.se Nevertheless, a shift in
power and influence from the 'old' elite to the 'new' is noticeable. and the 'limits of
the possible' in relation to rules of war are revealed by the results of co-operation
between the two. Disregarding the politics of class envy once again, it is of interest
that in Germany in particular a new industrial middle class was able to influence
the way in which World War 1 was waged. The product both of new schools of
military thougbt and of new IndustIial weaponry, the politics of 'tolal war' became
current, stimulated by an uneven synergy between those whose personal histories
had no such 'warrior' or chivalric tradition, and those who did. With new
weaponry, considerations of efficiency emerged pre-eminent. Treaties were
abandoned, concepts of 'necessity' enlarged, and war made more ruthless, or
'total'.
CUriously. various members of the 'new enemy' appear to share many of these
'nouveau rtche' characteristics, As noted above, bin laden is viewed
simultaneously as a political figure and as a member of an emerging elite, yet his
family's wealth Is reputedly self-made. In an insightful essay on post- or non-
colonial, 'new', non-western intellectual elttes, Benda makes the following
observation:
[Nlon-westem Intelligentslas, Insofar as they are politlcaliy active - ... - tend
to be social revolutionartes whose ideological aims as often as not militate
against the status quo. Since, by definition, most of these aims are western-
derived and transplanted to a social envirorunent inherently still far more
conservative than is true of the more advanced industrtal societies of the
west, the task of social engineering becomes far more radical, .. ,97
96 As noted above, text accompanying note 88, 'revolutionary terrortsts' also
developed their own 'code of honour', with limited revolutionary aims such as the
assassination of individuals, e.g.. the assassination of the Austrtan Archduke
Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, on the 525th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo
PolJe In 1389, rather than today's stray bombs tossed In shopping districts.
97 H.J. Benda, 'Elites', In F. Tachau, ed., supra note 9, pp. 105, 107 - 108. Cf. A.
Rashld, 'Bloody trail of the world's most wanted terrorist', The Daily Telegraph, 21
December 2000, p. 12.
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He adds:
In opposing the status quo of traditional non-western societies. most of the
"new" intellectuals also tend to oppose the status quo of a world which
either directly or indirectly can be held responsible for the internal social
and political conditions that fonn the prtme target of the Intelligentsia's
attack. Thus "feudalism" as well as colonialism - rule by entrenched native
classes or rule by foreigners - can be blamed on the political, military and
economic preponderance of the western world.se
The reasons for rules of restraint in warfare are presumably not within the
interests of bin Ladin and his ilk, while the efficient achievement of their goals
presumably is. However that may be, a competing Islamic presence also entails
economic competition for the control of world resources - be they oil. money. or
wider geo-strategic assets. A political-economic agenda which is then fore-
grounded by the occasional. erratic use of random violence anywhere. in which all
available means or methods of attack are employed, simply must be stopped, Such
violence wreaks widespread and indiscriminate terror. That is all. Its purpose is
irrelevant. Any prior consensus, in the sense of 'lawful' confines for mutually-
agreed restraints on the use of force and violence. for purposes of reciprocal
survival. cannot be sustained in the face of such a phenomenon. There is no
possibility of a fundamental, utilitarian 'meeting of minds', for purposes of
practicable humanitarian restraint within a framework of 'modernised'
international humanitarian law, and It Is at this point that terrortsm loses Its
political context. to be viewed simply as a criminal act. However. once terrorist
acts are left to be dealt with under domestic state criminal justice systems.
differential prosecutions renew political contexts. If only for this reason alone,
intemationallaws of war have needed to define combatant status in increasingly
broad terms, as is now discussed.
98 H,J, Benda, supra note 97, p, 109, See also T, Garton Ash, 'First, the biography
..;', The Guardian, 10 November 2001, p. 16 ('[d]oes bin Laden really want to
destroy the west, to purify Islam, to topple the Saudi royal house - or merely to
change the Saudi succession?').
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B. Status.
The laws of war rest for their effectiveness on delineating status. Preliminarily.
there are rungs of differential treatment depending upon combatant status, as in
that between officers and the rank-and-Itle.w A disciplined military Is essentially
non-egalitarian and hierarchical. The rules are clear. and not likely to raise any
deftnitional problems in relation to international law. Secondly. and rather more
controversially, there is the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants.
The intemationallaws of war are designed to protect certain people: prisoners of
war and non-combatants in the power of the adverse party are cases in point.
Captured members of the Taliban in Mghanistan have generally been afforded
prisoner of war treatment. Those states100 which are party to the humanitarian
instruments are also obliged to seek out and prosecute alleged offenders against
the proWbltlon of the perpetration of terrorism during an armed conflict.w- In
contrast. captured members of al-Queda have not generally benefited from various
protections otherwise afforded by international law. They are Instead being dealt
with under the domestic laws of capturing forces.
The 'new enemy' exists in interdependent cells, 102 which fact illustrates well the
extent to which events have outstlipped former boundartes. and the fact that the
'limits of the possible' in the evolution ofintemationallaws of war in relation to
status may have been surpassed. Put another way, the core distinction in status
between combatant and non-combatant arguably has been stretched beyond
99 Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16, 43 - 45.
100 Between 1969 and its accession in 1989 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation declared Its intention to abide by Geneva law
on a number of occasions. See Recent Publications, Meyer, 4 Interights Bulletin 13
(1989).
tor First Convention, Article 49; Second Convention, Article 50; Third Convention,
ArtIcle 129: Fourth Convention. ArtIcle 146: Protocol I, ArtIcle 85(1). Cf. 'Military
Tribunals to Resemble Courts-Martial". New¥ork TImes (online). 20 March 2002.
accessed at http://nytimes.com/aponllne/natlonal/AP-MilItary-TrIbunals.html.
102 For a broad-ranging discussion of the many faces of 'terrorism', including those
which lead to an increase in governmental surveillance, see generally Le Monde
Diplomatlgue, August 1996.
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sustainable limits. Professor Trainin describes well the early controversy which
ensued during the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 when the time anived to
determine the 'lawfulness' of milltia and volunteer corps which participate
alongside their state's regular armies. Ultimately. such irregular troops were
'permitted', provided the following conditions were met: they were (I) to be
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) to have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance: (3) to carry arms openly: and (4) to
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 103
Moreover. protection was likewise afforded to participants in a levee en rnasse, at
the first approach of a belligerent, 'if they carry arms openly and if they respect the
laws and customs of war',104
The moderntsation of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 expanded on this initial
list, 105 by mcludmg (1) members of regular armed forces beionging to a party to the
conliict not recognised by the detaining power, (2) authorised camp followers, and
(3) the crew of the merchant martne and civil aircraft. There is also provision made
for equivalent prisoner of war treatment. Protocol I, Article 43, however, takes a
different approach - and by so doing fully exhibits an appreciation of new forms of
warfare:
1. The anned forces of a party to a conflict consist of all organised armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that
party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that party is represented by
a government or an authority not recognised by an adverse Party. Such
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which. inter
alia. shall enforce compliance with the rules of intemationallaw applicable
in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict (..) are combatants,
that is to say, they have the light to participate directly tn hostilities.
103 Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907. Article 1.
104 Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907. Article 2.
105 First Convention, Article 13; Second Convention, Article 13; Third Convention.
Article 4A.
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3. When a party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law
enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties
to the conflict.
Protocol I, Article 44(1), adds that 'all combatants are obliged to comply with the
rules of international law applicable in anned conflict' ,106 Article 44(3) requires
combatants merely
[TJo distinguish themselves from the ctvilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack,
Recognising, however. that there are situations in armed conflicts where,
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so
distinguish himself. he shall retain his status as a combatant. provided that,
in such situations. he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he ts engaged In a
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he Is to
participate.
Clearly, Protocol I expands on the horizontal appllcabllity oflaws of war, and an
attempt is made to restrain as many active participants in international armed
conflicts as is possible. 107 This constitutes further recognition that laws of war in
relation to status delineations are essentially a function of military necessity rather
than of sentiment.
Such a premise sits nonetheless within an assumption that wars occur in order to
achieve limited, or at least predictable, objectives. Once such objectives are
secured, the logic goes, a war ends. Total destruction is not typically what is or
should be sought in war, particularly in the sense of intentional destruction so
complete as to reflect an utter disregard of post-war consequences. In contrast,
however, stands 'total war', which of course is not new to the twentieth century.
The prime characteristics of 'total war' are war aims which are more or less
106 [Emphasis added.)
107 Note, however, the continuing refusal of some states, most notably the V.S., to
ratify Protocol I.
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unlimited, in the sense of 'the possibly total destruction of the enemy's economy,
greater and greater devastation'. 108 As noted by Kunz, '[tlotal war is the result of
the combination of technological progress in arms with a changed manner of
waging war, of the combination of unlimited use of highly destructive weapons for
unlimited war aims'. 109 In turn. these elements are in fact reflected in the broad
approach taken In Protocol 1 to combatant status. and the attempt is made once
again to encourage humanitartan restraint.
The problem remains the relevance of status distinctions in relation to a 'total war',
as
The new thing is the unlimited war alms .... Such type of total war makes it
necessary on all sides to indoctrtnate each belligerent nation with a deadly
hatred of the enemy, to make the enemy infamous down to the roots of his
national, htstorical and cultural character and history. Total war must be
fought In ideological terms; it is no hazard that the word "crusade" Is again
fashionable; ... world-wide wars of annihilation. where nothing but
unconditional surrender. total conquest. economic ruin, permanent
crippling of the enemy will do. ... . And this reversion to barbarism naturally
will make itself felt, too, in times of so-called peace ....110
This point is as crucial today as it was at the time of wntmg, Whether or not a 'war
on giobal terror' constitutes a type of 'crusade', it certalnly can be argued that
changes in the nature of warfare have made the distinction-m-application between
'civilised' and 'savage' states or groups once again relevant. Assuming for present
purposes that this is so, the effective application of laws of war to 'barbaric'
conflicts is placed increasingly in doubt, if only because to do so would necessitate
multiplyJng political fictions. Colby, once again, takes a realistic approach:
When combatants and non-combatants are practically identical among a
people, and savage or semi-savage peoples take advantage of this identity to
108 J.L. Kunz, supra note 41, p. 41
109 fd.. p. 40, citing B.H. Liddell Hart, The Revolution In Warfare (New Haven,
1947).
HO Id.. pp. 41 .. 422. See also LP. Trainin, supra note 11, pp. 549 - 550
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effect ruses, surprises. and massacres on the "regular" enemies, ... the mind
must approach differently all matters of strategy and tactics. and,
necessarily also. matters of rules of war.u-
Combine this point with issues raised earlier about the effects of societal change on
the uses to which new technology is put. factor-in the competing (economic)
interests of those who pursue a 'new kind of war'. and a re-focused level of clarity
occurs. The lingering spectre of new theones of war necessity which characterised
German aggression throughout the first half of the twentieth century were as much
the product of societal change as they were of a desire to test new war inventions
and theories. 112 AdolfHltler, who Craig characterises as 'a force without a real
historical past', 113 was notorious also for 'tremendous resources of patience' ,114 'his
ability to attract the masses and win their allegfancetne his abilities in the field of
visual propaganda.us and his 'unconditionality, his utter ruthlessness in action')17
More telllngly, perhaps, Hitler understood the power ofviolence and terror: 'in the
early days of the party he became convinced that a bloody affray in the streets was
a better advertisement for the party than a dozen pamphlets'. 1is
As noted by Kunz. '(I]t Is fundamental to understand that technological
developments make total war only technically possible, but not inevitable',l19
Intemationallaws of war remained effective during World War 2, even though they
were violated on a massive scale by all the beUigerents: the predictability aimed for
througb 'rules' for waging war was perverted into the predictability of on-going
III E. Colby. supra note I. p. 279.
112 For a discussion of the German military build-up prior to World War 2, see E.
Chadwtck, "Doves and Fireballs": German-Soviet Neutrality. Collective Security.
and the League of Nations'. in Traditional Neutrality Revisited. supra note 10. at p.
89.
113 G.A. Craig, Germany 1866- 1945 (Oxford: 'O.D.P.• 1981). p. 543.
114 Id.. p. 545.
115 Id,
116 Id.. p. 547.
117 Id.• p. 548.
118 Id.
119 J ,L. Kunz, supra note 41, p, 41.
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savagery. As such. the means and methods for waging war altered. and the
Geneva Conventions, subsequently modernised. If. therefore, the fact of a 'new
kind' of total war, in the sense of unlimited means, methods. and targets of
destruction, has emerged. the interplay of war, economics, liberatlon-rhetortc and
terrorism locks. If it is also assumed that modern war is ideology-driven. yet led by
leaders who have little or no concept of a restraining warrior or chivalric code, the
rationale for status gradations and any other distinctions found stjll tn codified
laws of war cannot any longer serve their intended purpose. Heightened
predictability is the very outcome the 'new enemy' in asymmetric warfare will wish
to avoid. Expectations of further savagery. on the basis of prior performance. then
become only a self-perpetuating recipe for continuing disruption, witb predictable
effects on civil society.120
5. Conclusion,
There is always widespread incomprehension when an atrocity occurs. There are
also many differences in legal approach to nineteenth and twentieth century armed
conflicts. On the one hand. war was legal. while more recently. the aggressive use
of inter-state force is prohibited. The fact remains. however. that all the
intemationallaws of war in place at any particular point in time have had as their
purpose the political regulation of technological inventiveness, and of those
persons who employ 'licit'. as opposed to 'illicit'. violence. Entrepreneunalism thus
has constantly been confined within multiple. and competing, political-economic
agendas. In turn. any resulting agreements reached have been achieved through
processes involving tough negotiation, which, in essence, constituted a mlnimalist
approach to international regulatlon.rsr protection has been provided at the most
basic level of international co-operation - during times of war - to combatants,
non-combatants, and those finding themselves in occupied territory.
Traditional wartime guidelines of proportionality and military necessity have
similarly had to adapt witbin tbese mIrdma1ist conllnes to tbe changing face of
warfare, albeit while reflecting a tacit agreement that war aims should be limited in
120 Supra notes 24 and 25.
121 A point made by G. Willemin and R. Heacock, International Committee of the
Red Cross, Vol. 2 (Lancaster: Marttnue Nljhoff, 1984), p, 167.
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some way, or to some extent, in order to assure ultimate survival. If only for this
reason alone. Internattonal lawe of war should not be viewed solely from an
aspirational vantage point of humanitarianism. To do so would represent the
despised 'sentimentality' which nearly led to the destruction of rules of war during
World War 1. Instead. a better view is that rules of reciprocal restraint remain a
function. first. of military necessity. and secondly. of proportionality. in the sense,
once again. of variably limited war aims. Some sense of bilateral reciprocity is
required. and must be seen to be pre-eminent. Protocol 1 of 1977. for example,
recognises guerrilla bands fighting in modem wars of national liberation as lawful
combatants if. put simply. they are organised and commanded by a responsible
authority, and are seen to comply with the rules of intemationallaw applicable in
anned confliCt.122
However. has the time arrived to 'reality-check' the intematlonallaws of war? As
noted eartter.raa doctrinal disagreement persists over the legal priorltisation of the
general prohibition of the use of force except in self-defence, and older laws of war
which incorporate parameters of military necessity and proportionality within a
much more specialised set of rules. While in most cases the better view supports
the pre-eminence of international rules of law over the general law for the duration
of an armed conflict, the very existence of tension between the two levels of law is
of note. On the one hand. an early. and fundamental distinction existed between
those rules made applicable to equal enemies, and those applied in other
situations, such as to 'savages' or, more controversially. to 'equal' enemies who did
not respect the rules. Rules of restraint were either reciprocated. or they were not
observed. A framework of military escalation in relation to the reciprocity shown
by one's enemies was a simple. but rather elegant solution to what otherwise would
have been viewed as a political impossibility - one capable moreover of preventing
what little agreement there was. In contrast, developments in the post-1945 era
have shown that there is potentially more to be gained from humanitarian
treatment 'in all circumstances'. than not, and reciprocity is no longer a legal pre-
condition.
>22 Protocol 1, of 1977. Article 43(1).
123 Supra note 92, and accompanying text.
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Be that as it may. the point remains that any attempt at a utilitarian approach to
the use of force must be re-assessed on a continuing basis. War aims must change
as the intensity and duration of violence require. Any utilitarian calculus of war
objectives - humanitarian or otherwise - will reflect this reality. and be modified
accordingly. Clearly. any contract based on mutual understandings can be altered
over time through custom and practice. In contrast. the respect afforded to
humanitartan principles 'in all circumstances' is an admirable albeit competing
requirement. Humanitarian coverage was much improved. first, in 1949 when the
participation, or si omnes, clause was modernised.ras Protocol 1 of 1977. in which
the 'grave breaches' system was enlarged to include additional categories of 'lawful'
combatant. wider categories of means and methods of attack were prohibited. and
civilian protections were improved, represented a great leap forward in the cause of
universal restraint in the use of armed force. Nevertheless, the words 'in all
circumstances' arguably permit sufficient flexibility stl1l to governments and
conunanders in the field alike when the time arrives to employ force to counter
force.
Reciprocal, mutually-respected rules ofwartlme restraint have saved many lives,
left undisturbed many material resources, and ensured Wgh levels of battlefield
predictability. Regulation, and good surveillance of battlefield tactics, have each
improved compliance in many instances. The institution of war tribunals to try
those accused of atrocities can only provide further assurances that impunity will
not go unpunished. Much progress has been achieved. even though the scope and
content of some rules remain uncertain.rae and the precise status of those
collectively utilising armed force in particular circumstances remains in some
doubt. However, such rules as exist rest on an assumption that war aims are
limited. The reappearance of the tactics of 'total war', in the sense of an utter
disregard for the destruction that may ensue from the use of particular means and
methods of warfare, signals the emergence of a competing economic force, and
thus the need for realistic rules.
124 Supra note 53, and accompanying text.
125 As in the 'lawfulness' of nuclear weaponry, and the recognition of 'terrorists' as
lawful combatants.
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Significantly. the appearance of a so-called 'new enemy', who operates violently
from the 'grey zones' of international political and economic life. threatens many of
the heretofore ascertainable frameworks of analysis. With access to important
industrial-technological-economic resources, the 'new enemy' is a 'wild card', with
utilitarian objectives all its own. The use of armed force for economic purposes,
the rhetoric in support of which encourages a reliance on terror for advantage
signals an underlying calculus which does not rest on any assumption of
humanitarianism. Terrorism is inherently political; its definition. its perpetration,
its prosecution - all are political. The problems the use of terror-war creates are
not amenable to contexts of literalism, by which is meant a neutral approach to
finding solutions. Moreover, there Is little If any predictability possible when
civilian objects, such as commercial aircraft or sports shoes, become methods of
random attack. Where resources are then expended to forestall or prevent further
such random attacks, in a perverse search for 'new' predictability, the terrorist has
succeeded. Whether a 'war' against 'global terror' is a 'war' to which international,
restraining, reciprocal rules of war can attach must remain very much in doubt.
